Nowadays, the management and analyses of 'big data' are becoming indispensable for numerous organizations all over the world. In many cases, multiple organizations want to perform data analyses on their combined databases. Skyline query is one of the popular operations for selecting representative objects from a large database, where any other object within the database does not dominate each of the representative objects, called 'skyline'. Like other data analytics operations, the multi-party skyline query can provide benefits to the participating organizations by retrieving the skyline objects from their combined databases. Such a multi-party skyline query demands the disclosure of individual parties' objects to others during the computation. But, owing to the data privacy and security concern of the present IT era, such disclosure of the individual parties' databases is strictly prohibited. Considering this issue, we are proposing a new framework for the privacy-preserving multi-party skyline query, exploiting additive homomorphic encryption along with data anonymization, perturbation, and randomization techniques. The underlying protocols within our proposed framework ensure that every participating party can identify its multi-party skyline objects without revealing the objects to others during the multi-party skyline query. The detailed privacy and security analyses show that the proposed framework can achieve the desired computation goal without privacy leakage. Besides, the performance evaluation through complexity analyses, extensive simulations, and comprehensive comparison also demonstrate the utility and the efficiency of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Organizations throughout the world are producing a vast amount of data, known as 'big data'. Consequently, the demand for big data analytics tools is growing rapidly. These tools have attracted massive attention to organizations and researchers for making strategic decisions and for new knowledge acquisitions. Open market product pricing, risk management in investment, consumer buying pattern analysis, financial transaction analysis, health data analysis, etc. are remarkable examples of big data analyses. Still, big data The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek . is introducing new challenges for collection, storage, process, analyze, etc.
In the current trend of IT, multiple organizations dealing with similar kind of services are collecting compatible big data, and have noticed the importance of analytical results that can be found from the union of their databases. Such sort of joint data analyses requires multi-party computation over the combined databases of all organizations. Since many organizational databases may contain various sensitive data like personal or financial data, revealing these data can seriously violate the individuals' privacy and can be the reason of significant financial and goodwill loss for the organizations. As a result, when multiple organizations want to analyze VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ their data jointly, no organization is willing to disclose their sensitive data. In this paper, we address this problem. Already, the skyline query has gained popularity for selecting representative objects from a large database. It chooses a set of representative objects in such a way, in which no other object in the database dominates these representative objects [1] , [2] . For example, the table in Fig. 1 shows a database of real estates, which contains records about real estates' price and its distance from the beach. From its corresponding plot diagram, points A, B, D, and G are not dominated by any other point in the database, and therefore, these are the skyline points. When a customer asks the agent to recommend some real estates, the agent can suggest some potential real estates from the skyline query.
Undoubtedly, the multi-party skyline query provides more benefits to the organizations by selecting skyline objects from the union of their databases. The organizations may want to locate their skyline objects that are not dominated by any other object of their combined databases. However, such computation is very sensitive w.r.t. security and privacy challenges. Let us assume that several agents have a collection of similar kind of real estate records. To provide better and competitive suggestions for their customers, every agent may also want to determine its real estates which are not dominated by any real estate of other agents. In such a case, all agents need to perform the multi-party skyline query on their union databases. The agents may also utilize the multi-party skyline query to assess their real estates. In conventional skyline query, it is not possible to obtain the multi-party skyline result without disclosing the objects to others.
Unfortunately, very few existing works [3] - [7] addressed the issues of data privacy and security for skyline query. However, their secure computation circumstances are different from our proposal. Besides, most of the existing works incorporate one or more semi-honest third-parties to conduct the privacy-preserving skyline query, where the privacy of the individual party's database profoundly depend on the credibility of the third party(s). Since the third party(s) may involve in the conspiracy, it is challenging to assume an unbiased third-party(s) who will be trusted by all parties.
Therefore, we propose a new framework for privacypreserving multi-party skyline query in this paper. In the proposed framework, individual parties/organizations do not need to reveal their private databases to others. We design three intra-dependent protocols to implement the framework through which only the objects owner can identify its multi-party skyline objects. Even, no party is able to know the number of multi-party skyline objects of other parties.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: we review some existing works on skyline query, privacy-preserving multi-party computation, and privacy-preserving skyline query in Section II. In Section III, we discuss the preliminaries of the skyline query and the Paillier cryptosystem, as required to develop the framework. Then, we explain the proposed system model with desired privacy properties in Section IV. In Section V, we specify the detail framework with brief explanations and examples. Next, we explain the privacy and security analyses for the proposed framework in Section VI. After that, we evaluate its performance, and compare with other work in Section VII. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
The works on skyline query processing, privacy-preserving multi-party computation, and privacy-preserving skyline query are related to this research work. Subsection II-A focuses on the skyline query, subsection II-B discusses about privacy-preserving multi-party computation, and subsection II-C highlights on privacy-preserving skyline query.
A. SKYLINE QUERY
Borzsonyi et al. [1] , who are the introducer of the skyline operator, proposed three algorithms for computing skyline: Block-Nested-Loops (BNL), Divide-and-Conquer (D&C), and B-tree-based schemes. Later, Kossmann et al. [8] improved the D&C algorithm and proposed the nearest-neighbor (NN) algorithm for efficiently pruning out dominated objects by iteratively partitioning the data space based on the nearest objects. Similarly, Chomicki et al. [9] improved the BNL algorithm by presorting the objects. They proposed Sort-Filter-Skyline (SFS) as a variant of BNL. Another efficient algorithm for skyline query is Branch-and-Bound Skyline (BBS), proposed by Papadias et al. [10] , which is a progressive algorithm based on the Best First Nearest Neighbor (BF-NN) algorithm.
Besides, Balke et al. [11] introduced skyline queries in distributed environments. They proposed various approaches for computing distributed skyline efficiently from the vertically partitioned web information. On the other hand, both Wang et al. [12] and Chen et al. [13] proposed efficient skyline query processing frameworks in the structured P2P networks. Rocha et al. [14] also proposed a grid-based approach for distributed skyline processing. This approach assumed that each peer maintained a grid-based data summary structure for describing its data distribution.
B. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION
Privacy-preserving multi-party computation is vital for modern business data processing. Yao [15] first introduced it for two-party setting and then Goldreich et al. [16] extended it for multi-party setting. According to [16] , security in multi-party computation means that the individual parties' data remain secret during the computation and the parties could only get the computed results. Generally, the secure multi-party computation protocols are complicated than the specific purpose protocols.
Privacy-preserving multi-party data-mining problem is another example of secure multi-party computation. It is considered as one of the key research areas of 'big data'. Lindell and Pinkas [17] proposed the algorithm for performing the data mining operation on the combined databases of two parties, where one party does not disclose its database to another party during computation. In Agrawal's paper [18] , the privacy-preserving data mining problem is described considering two parties: Alice and Bob; where Alice is allowed to conduct data mining operation on a private database owned by Bob, but Bob wants to prevent Alice from accessing precise information in individual data records, allowing Alice to conduct the data mining operations. Although these two problems are quite similar, the approaches proposed in [17] and [18] are different. Reference [17] used the secure multi-party computation protocols; while [18] applied the data perturbation method.
Most of the existing solutions for multi-party computation [19] , [20] utilized homomorphic encryption for comparing the private data of the individual parties, although these protocols are highly expensive w.r.t. computation and communication complexity [21] . Lin and Tzeng [22] introduced another secure comparison protocol based on homomorphic encryption known as the 0-encoding and 1-encoding scheme. It is a two-party secure comparison protocol for comparing two private data in two rounds of data exchange.
However, the complexity of the 0-encoding and 1-encoding scheme also depends on the length of the integer attribute value in the number of binary bits like secure comparison protocol proposed by Lin and Jaromczyk [19] and Veugen et al. [20] .
The local differential privacy (LDP) schemes have been proposed for privacy-preserving distributed data collection [23] - [26] . By using the LDP schemes, the database owners can ensure the confidentiality of individual database records shared with a collector, while the collector computes on the differential private version of the database records to publish the statistical aggregate results from the collected databases. These schemes utilize various data anonymization techniques to maintain data privacy and also estimates the tradeoff between data utility and data privacy.
C. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SKYLINE QUERY
Like other privacy-preserving multi-party computation problems, the privacy-preserving multi-party skyline query is also being researched considering various perspectives.
Concerning the privacy of user's dynamic skyline query, three different frameworks were proposed by Chen et al. [4] , Liu et al. [5] , and Hua et al. [6] . Unfortunately, their secure skyline computation objectives are different from our current scenario. Within their frameworks, the data provider cannot know the user's dynamic skyline query. On the other hand, the user cannot know the entire private database of the data provider other than the skyline query result.
Liu et al. [7] proposed a skyline computation framework for two parties, which can also be deployable in a multi-party computation platform. They considered pruning out the dominated objects iteratively by using secure dominance comparison between two individual parties' objects. Although their proposed Efficient Secure Vector Comparison (ESVC) protocol between two parties does not disclose the object's attributes to one another, it reveals the dominance relation between their two specific objects, to both parties.
The framework proposed by Zaman et al. [3] transforms the multi-party objects' attributes securely into the rank of the attribute value on each dimension and then uses the attributes' rank for computing the multi-party skyline. Although it seemed to be efficient than relevant frameworks, still there exists suspicion that whither the attributes' rank of the objects can ensure the privacy adequately, or not.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section defines the essential preliminaries considered for the proposed framework. Besides, the common notations used in this paper are introduced in Table 1 .
A. DOMINANCE AND SKYLINE
Given a dataset DS with D-dimensions {d 1 , d 2 , · · · , d D } and N objects {O 1 , O 2 , · · · , O N }, where O i .d j denotes the j-th dimension value of object O i . We assume that the smaller value in each dimension is better, without loss of generality. 
1) DOMINANCE

An object
3) ADDITIVITY OF SKYLINE COMPUTATION [27] Given a dataset DS that is composed by union of K datasets such that DS = DS 1 ∪· · ·∪DS K , the following equation holds:
This implies that each skyline object of DS must be a skyline object of DS's subset. In Fig. 2 , we denote that the red, the green, and the blue points represent the objects of DS 1 , DS 2 , and DS 3 , respectively. The skyline objects of DS 1 , DS 2 and DS 3 is given as Sky(
It is apparent that the common skyline objects is given as
We also introduce and frequently used two common terminologies throughout the paper: the local skyline object and the global skyline object. Here the local skyline object denotes the non-dominated skyline object of a sub-dataset, i.e., an object of Sky(DS 1 ), while the global skyline object denotes the skyline object computed from the union of subdatasets, i.e., an object of Sky(DS).
B. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
Paillier cryptosystem [28] is a probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme that possesses additive homomorphic property. Consider pk and sk be the Paillier public encryption key and the private decryption key, respectively. Also assume m 1 and m 2 be two distinct plaintext integers while [m 1 ] pk and [m 2 ] pk represent their ciphertext, respectively. Based on this scenario, Paillier cryptosystem has the following additive homomorphic properties: where n is the part of Paillier public key and k is a constant integer.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIRED PRIVACY PROPERTIES
In this section, we formalize the system model, and the desired privacy for our proposed framework.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
During the system design phase, we mainly concentrate on the privacy-aware multi-party skyline. We consider each party has a private dataset, where all parties are connected with each other. Without revealing the dataset to others, each party wants to identify the global skyline objects from their datasets that are not dominated by any object of their combined datasets. Here, we adopt the semi-honest adversary model and assume that all parties are honest-but-curious, i.e., all parties strictly follow the protocol but intend to extract the private data of other parties from the computation. Due to the additivity property of skyline computation, we can say that each object of the global skyline must be an object of any of the local skyline of the parties. Therefore, we assume that, before computing the global skyline securely, every party computes its local skyline objects. The local skyline computation can reduce the complexity of the global skyline computation significantly by pruning out the dominated objects from the local databases, and thus improve the computation efficiency.
Assume, Table 2 represents the private datasets of three individual parties, while Table 3 shows their local skyline objects. After computing the local skyline, each party wants to identify their global skyline objects without revealing their local skyline objects to others. Based on Table 3 , Table 4 derives the global skyline objects owned by individual parties.
B. DESIRED PRIVACY
Our framework implicitly assumes that all participating parties do not collude with each other. It does not create any significant security threat for the honest parties even if some dishonest parties make any conspiracy. The proposed framework will possess the following privacy requirements:
• Any party does not expose its private objects directly to others during the computation. The parties either encrypt or anonymize the data before sharing it to others.
• Each party can only identify its own global skyline objects. No party is able to locate the global skyline objects of other parties; even a party cannot know how many global skyline objects are owned by other parties. VOLUME 7, 2019 For example, after secure comparison between the local skyline objects of Table 3 , Party 1 has no information about a global skyline object that is owned by Party 2 or Party 3 . Also, Party 1 cannot know how many global objects Party 2 and Party 3 have owned.
• Any party cannot know whether its global skyline object dominates any object of others or not. After computation, each party can locate its own global skyline objects, but any party cannot know whether its global skyline objects dominate any objects or not. According to Table 4 , after secure computation, Party 1 can identify that O 1,2 is a global skyline object, but Party 1 cannot know whether O 1,2 dominates any local skyline object of others, or not.
• Any party cannot know how many objects of others dominate its dominated objects. If a local skyline object is not a global skyline object, it is evident that at least an object of other parties dominates a specific dominated object, but any party cannot know the number of dominant objects for a specific dominated object precisely. According to Table 3 and • When the number of parties is more than two, no party can identify any particular party, whose object(s) dominates its specific dominated object. Using secure computation with Party 1 and Party 2 , Party 3 can find that O 3,3 is dominated by other parties' object(s). However, Party 3 is unable to know: O 3,3 is dominated by Party 1 's object(s), or Party 2 's object(s), or both parties' objects.
V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Initially, each party computes its local skyline objects, generates the key pair of Paillier cryptosystem, and distributes the public encryption key to others prior to multi-party skyline computation. The detail of Paillier cryptosystem and its homomorphic properties are available in [28] . We design three intra-dependent protocols to build our proposed framework. 
Then shuffle the object pair list randomly so that the list does not follow any chronological sequence. After that, Party B uses the SDC protocol to compare the dominance relation between each pair of objects from the shuffled list. Party B also randomizes the parameter order of the SDC protocol according to Step 6 of Algorithm 1. Because of the random shuffling of the object pair list and the parameter order randomization, Party A cannot distinguish the objects (even Party A 's own local skyline objects), which are being compared through the SDC protocol.
The two output values of the SDC protocol obtained by Party B denote the dominance relation between the compared objects. Among these two objects, if an object dominates another object, the output of the SDC protocol for the dominated object will be 1, whereas it will be 0 for the dominant object. But, both outputs will be 0 if the compared objects do not dominate each other. Since Party A encrypts the outputs of the SDC protocol by pk A , Party B cannot know the dominance relation between two specific objects. However, using homomorphic addition, Party B can add the encrypted outputs of the SDC protocol with the associated encrypted Randomly computes either
Computes Table 5 and Table 6 are considered as the examples of the 2-dimensional local skyline objects of Party A and Party B , respectively, and from these we can compare between their local skyline objects.
Here we can observe that A 1 Step 5 to Step 9 of Algorithm 1, Party B gets dcount B A A and dcount A B A as shown in Table 7 . Since the skyline objects are not dominated by any object, the number of dominant objects of a skyline object is zero. However, Party B is unable to differentiate the non-dominated objects since dcount B A , and dcount A B are encrypted by pk A . In contrast, Party A also cannot determine the global skyline VOLUME 7, 2019 Table 7 , Table 8 presents the computation results of Step 10 to Step 13 of Algorithm 1. Within the MPS protocol, the encrypted dominant objects counter obtained by one party for each local skyline object of another party will be used for computing multi-party skyline, from which only the individual party can identify its global skyline objects.
B. SECURE DOMINANCE COMPARISON (SDC) PROTOCOL
The SDC protocol is a sub-protocol of the DOC protocol, and it is designed to compare the dominance relation between two parties' encrypted objects. It is the principal component of the proposed framework. Same as the DOC protocol, we explain the SDC protocol considering two parties: Party A and Party B , where Party A has the key pair (pk A , sk A ), and Party B has the public key pk A and two encrypted objects [P] A and [Q] A . Among these two encrypted objects, one object is owned by Party A , and another one is owned by Party B . As already described within the DOC protocol, Party A can not know its particular object, which is compared through the SDC protocol.
The SDC protocol assures that Party A cannot know Party B 's object, whereas Party B is unable to know the dominance relation between two specific objects. We design the SDC protocol obeying the basic principle of the ESVC Protocol [7] . However, to improve the computation efficiency, we ignore the 0-encoding and 1-encoding scheme based secure integer comparison protocol [22] used in the ESVC protocol. Instead, we adopt the data anonymization, perturbation, and randomization techniques. Furthermore, to maintain the desired privacy, we encrypt the dominance relation between two objects. Algorithm 2 describes the SDC protocol and Fig. 4 depicts its data-flow diagram.
We acknowledge three types of dominance relations between two objects P and Q: either (1) P ≺ Q, or (2) Q ≺ P, or (3) P and Q do not dominate each other. To achieve the dominance relation between two objects, at first, Party B expands D-dimensional encrypted objects [P (p 1 , · · · , p D )] A and [Q (q 1 , · · · , q D )] A into four 2D length encrypted vectors [X] A , X A , [Y ] A and Y A . In this regard, Party B generates four 2D length random integer array to anonymize the vector elements using arbitrary transformation. These are M = (m 1 , . . . , m 2D ) ∈Z >1 , M = (m 1 , . . . , m 2D ) ∈Z >1 , K = (k 1 , . . . , k 2D ) ∈Z >0 , and K = (k 1 , . . . , k 2D ) ∈Z >0 . Then, by applying the homomorphic addition and multiplication properties of Paillier = (1 1 , ..., 1 D , 0 D+1 , . .., 0 2D ) and V = (1 1 , ..., 1 D , 0 D+1 , . .., 0 2D ); 3: Generates two 2D length random binary vector: σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ 2D ) σ i ∈0,1 and σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ 2D ) σ i ∈0,1 ;
i. Swaps each element x i ∈X A and y i ∈Y A if σ i = 1;
ii. Swaps each element x i ii. Creates D length binary vector ρ and set ρ i ∈ρ = 1 if α i ∈α > β i ∈β else set ρ i ∈ρ = 0;
iii. Creates D length binary vector ρ and set ρ i
Encrypts α, β, α , and β using pk A ; following equations: Next, Party B generates two 2D length random binary vector σ and σ to swap the vector elements randomly and also to compute W and W according to Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Considering two 2-dimensional encrypted object [P] A and [Q] A of Table 9 , Table 10 presents the computation results of Step 1 to Step 3 of Algorithm 2. After that, to enhance the security through the data perturbation, Party B generates four D length vectors of nonzero random integer: α ∈Z >0 , β ∈Z >0 , α ∈Z >0 , and β ∈Z >0 , s.t., α i∈α = β i∈β and α i ∈α = β i ∈β . Party B also creates two binary vector: ρ and ρ , and set ρ i ∈ρ and ρ i ∈ρ according to Step 4 of Algorithm 2.
Then, Party B concatenates α, β, ρ, α , β , and ρ with X, Y , W , X , Y , and W , respectively. Party B also generates random permutation function π and π to shuffle the elements of concatenated vectors to obtain [S] A , [T ] A , G, S A , T A , and G according to Step 5 of Algorithm 2. After shuffling the vectors, Party B uses a hash function to compute the hash values h and h of binary vectors G and G , and sends [S] A , [T ] A , h, S A , T A , and h to Party A .
Following Table 10 and assuming α = (148, 165), β = (172, 140), α = (118, 154), and β = (103, 136), Table 11 and Table 12 present the computation results of Step 4 to Step 6 of Algorithm 2. Here, we consider π = (4, 6, 2, 5, 3, 1) and π = (3, 5, 1, 6, 2, 4). According to the equation [S] A ← π X|α A of Step 5 and considering the first element of π (i.e. 4) implies that after shuffling, the first vector element of [S] A will be the fourth element of concatenated vector X|α A . After receiving the encrypted vectors along with the expected hash values, Party A decrypts the vectors using the key sk A and obtains the plaintexts of S, T , S and T . Although Party A can compare the elements of the decrypted vectors, it will be quite impossible for Party A to reproduce the original objects due to the anonymization of the vector elements through arbitrary transformation and data perturbation.
From the decrypted vectors, Party A constructs the binary vectors U and U according to Step 9 of Algorithm 2. Then, by comparing H (U) with h, and H (U ) with h , Party A computes the dominance relation between two vectors S and T according to Step 10 to Step 12 of Algorithm 2. Table 13 shows the construction of U and U from the decrypted vectors for our running example. After comparing h with H (U), and h with H (U ), Party A can find h = H (U) but h = H (U ), which implies that S ≺ T . Therefore, Party A sets dom S := 0 and dom T := 1 according to Step 11 of Algorithm 2, which ultimately reflects the dominance comparison result between two objects P and Q. By examining the actual attributes of two encrypted objects P and Q within Table 9 , we can also affirm P ≺ Q. Algorithm 3 Multi-party Skyline (MPS) protocol Input: Each party has its local skyline objects, key pair, and public encryption keys of other parties;
• Party A has Sky (DS A ), (pk A , sk A ), and pk B , pk C , · · · ;
• Party B has Sky (DS B ), (pk B , sk B ), and pk A , pk C , · · · ;
• Party C has Sky (DS C ), (pk C , sk C ), and pk A , pk B , · · · ; · · · Output: Each party identifies its global skyline objects; 1: Each party obtains its number of dominant objects in encrypted form for each local skyline object of other parties through the DOC protocol;
· · · For Sky (DS A ) of Party A : 
Party Z sends f A A to Party A ; 10: Party A decrypts f A A using sk A and identifies each A i∈Sky(DS A ) as the global skyline object, if f A,i = 0;
11: end if
In order to prevent Party B to know the dominance relation between two objects, Party A also encrypts dom S and dom T using pk A before sending them to Party B . Finally, Party B assigns [dom S ] A and [dom T ] A to [dom P ] A and dom Q A , respectively.
C. MULTI-PARTY SKYLINE (MPS) PROTOCOL
The MPS protocol computes the global skyline from the privacy-preserving multi-party datasets. Each party identifies its global skyline objects through the MPS protocol described in Algorithm 3. Here, we explain how a party, e.g., Party A can identify its own global skyline objects. In the same way, other parties can also identify their global skyline objects.
At first, each party computes its number of dominant objects in encrypted form for other parties' local skyline objects through the DOC protocol. After that, according to
Step 2 of Algorithm 3, each party multiplies a random integer r ∈Z >1 with the encrypted dominant objects counter value obtained for each local skyline objects of other parties. Thus any party is unable to know precisely how many objects of other parties dominate its dominated local skyline objects. To explain our proposed framework, we denote this encrypted value as the masked dominant objects counter. Based on the number of participating parties, we design the rest of the MPS protocol as follows:
When the number of parties is two: If two parties, i.e., Party A Table 7 , Table 14 represents the computation results from which Party A identifies its global skyline objects. When the number of parties is more than two: We consider that one of the participating parties acts as the coordinator in this scenario. The primary responsibility of this coordinator is to select a collector who collects the encrypted value of the masked dominant objects counters for one party's local skyline objects from other parties. The coordinator must not select the owner of the local skyline objects as the collector of the encrypted masked dominant objects counters of those local skyline objects.
Suppose, the coordinator selects Party Z (one of the parties other than Party A ) as the collector of the encrypted value of the masked dominant objects counters for the local skyline objects of Party A . Therefore, the other parties send the encrypted value of the masked dominant objects counters for the local skyline objects of Party A to Party Z . Then, Party Z computes the encrypted sum of masked dominant objects counters (i.e., f A A ) according to Step 8 of Algorithm 3, and sends it to Party A . After receiving, Party A decrypts f A A , and identifies each A i∈Sky(DS A ) as the global skyline object if f A,i = 0.
Let us consider, four parties (Party A , Party B , Party C , and Party D ) want to identify their global skyline objects. Let Party A has three local skyline objects: A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 . Among these three objects, one object of Party B and two objects of Party C dominate A 1 ; one object of Party D dominates A 2 ; none of the object of other parties dominates A 3 . Further assume, the coordinator selects Party D as the collector of the encrypted values of the masked dominant objects counters for the local skyline objects of Party A . Based on these, Fig. 5 shows a data-flow diagram of the MPS protocol. Besides, Table 15 describes the computation results for the local skyline objects of Party A .
VI. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze the privacy and security aspects of the proposed framework. According to the composition theorem [29] , a framework is considered as secure as long as its elemental protocols are secure, alongside all the intermediate results are random or pseudo-random. Now, we analyze the underlying protocols of our proposed framework.
A. PRIVACY OF THE DOC PROTOCOL
According to Algorithm 1, Party B randomly shuffles the list of object pairs before comparing the dominance relation. 
B. PRIVACY OF THE SDC PROTOCOL
As stated in Algorithm 2, Party B generates four arrays of random integers M, K, M , and K to construct vectors X, X , Y , and Y . After that, Party B swaps the vector elements based on the random binary vectors σ and σ . Besides, Party B also concatenates random integer vectors with the constructed vectors, and then shuffles it using random permutation function π and π .
Since Party A does not know which specific object of Party A is being compared via the SDC protocol; without knowing M, R, M , R , σ , σ , π, and π , Party A cannot retrieve the object of Party B only from the decrypted vectors. On the other hand, Party A encrypts the dominance comparison result before sending it to Party B . Thereby, Party B cannot know the dominance relation between two specific objects. Thus, the SDC protocol can ensure required data privacy for both parties while they compare the dominance relation between their objects.
C. PRIVACY OF THE MPS PROTOCOL
According to Algorithm 3, every party masks each of the encrypted dominant objects counters of other parties' objects by multiplying a random integer. Thus, all parties are unable to know precisely how many objects dominate each of their dominated objects.
Furthermore, when more than two parties compute the multi-party skyline, any party does not send the encrypted value of the masked dominant objects counters to the corresponding local skyline objects' owner individually. Therefore, any party cannot identify which and how many parties' object(s) dominates its specific local skyline object.
D. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework also maintains the security of the datasets of all participating parties. Within Fig. 3, Fig. 4 , and Fig. 5 , we can observe that all the exchanged data are being encrypted before transmission between the parties. Therefore, even if an adversary or an intruder eavesdrops on the communication media to obtain the transmitted data, it cannot get anything from the encrypted content.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Here, we analyze the complexity and evaluate the performance of the proposed framework. Also, we present a comparison of the proposed framework.
A. COMPLEXITY ANALYSES
To present the complexity analyses, we summarize the required notations in Table 16 . Now the analyses of computation and communication complexity of DOC, SDC, and MPS protocols are presented in Table 17 , Table 18, and Table 19 , respectively.
B. EXPERIMENT
To evaluate the performance through simulation, we use two identical computers connected through Cisco Catalyst 2960-X Series Gigabit Switch, where one is considered as Party A and another as Party B . Each computer is configured with an Intel R Core i5-6500 3.20GHz CPU, 8GB memory, and 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 operating system. We develop our program using Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) framework and use 80-bit Paillier encryption key. We generate synthetic datasets for our experiment where each attribute value of the synthetic datasets is randomly picked from 32-bit unsigned integer.
Initially, we extract two sets of local skyline objects from the generated datasets to represent the local skyline objects of two parties. After that, we examine the effect of dominance comparison through the SDC protocol within the DOC protocol. Since the number of dominance comparison within the DOC protocol depends on the number of two parties' local skyline objects, we vary the number of both parties' local skyline objects during our experiment. We also vary the object dimension from 2 to 5. Based on these, Fig. 6 shows the runtime of the DOC protocol. From the figure, it is seen that the runtime is linearly proportional to the number of dominance comparison through the SDC protocol as well as the number of object dimension, which is apparent since the complexity of the SDC protocol depends on the number of object dimension. Although every party can compute with all other parties through the DOC protocol within the MPS protocol, it does not require to maintain any specific synchronization. Hence, we do not evaluate the runtime of the MPS protocol. 
C. COMPARISONS
The proposed framework utilizes data anonymization and randomization schemes for secure dominance comparison. However, it does not lose the universality of the objects dominance relation. Thus, the utility of data and the skyline query results are not limited by the proposed framework. Also, many multi-party computation systems include one or more trusted third parties. It is a severe risk to the system if the third party(s) has been compromised. Whereas, the proposed framework does not utilize such a trusted third party. Furthermore, every party firstly computes the local skyline objects set from its database in plaintext space. Therefore, it significantly reduces the complexity of multi-party computation.
So far as we know, only one framework [7] computes privacy-preserving multi-party skyline without incorporating any semi-honest trusted third party. For this reason, we compare with this one. The ESVC protocol proposed in [7] depends on the length of the attribute value in the number of binary bits since it adapts the 0-encoding and 1-encoding scheme for comparing two integer vector elements. In contrast, we substituted the secure integer comparison with data anonymization schemes within our SDC protocol. Thereby, the complexity of our SDC protocol does not depend on the attribute value length. Also, the ESVC protocol requires five rounds of data exchanges, whereas our SDC protocol requires only two rounds of data exchanges during secure dominance comparison. Thus, our SDC protocol is more efficient than that of the ESVC protocol. To compare the performance, we simulate both protocols for the dominance comparison of the two-dimensional dataset objects. Fig. 7 shows the runtime comparison of the proposed SDC protocol with the ESVC protocol. From the figure, we can see that the runtime of the ESVC protocol is much higher than the SDC protocol.
Moreover, the ESVC protocol discloses the dominance relation between two specific objects to both parties. Whereas, our SDC protocol does not reveal the dominance relation to anyone. Thus, our proposed framework enriches data privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel framework for the skyline query considering the data privacy issues of multi-party data analyses. The detailed explanation of the proposed framework, along with the proper examples of the underlying protocols, confirms that all participating organizations can recognize their multi-party skyline objects without disclosing their dataset objects to others. The privacy and security analyses demonstrate that the framework satisfies the desired privacy requirements. Also, through extensive performance evaluation, we show the efficiency of the proposed framework for real-world deployment. Due to the avoidance of 'secure integer comparison', and the exploitation of encryption of 'the dominance comparison result' within our SDC protocol, our proposed framework becomes significantly efficient and secure. A future plan of improvement is to extend the work for computing other variants of skyline query, e.g., k-skyband query (returns the set of objects that are dominated by at most k other objects), top k-dominating queries (returns the set of top-k objects that dominate the maximum number of objects), in a privacy-preserving way.
